A Brief History of Conflict in Central America Between the 1950s and the end of the Cold War, the overly exaggerated threat of communism led numerous US administrations to intervene in CA on the basis of the doctrine of national security. The trend continued with US National Security Decision Directive Number 17 signed by Ronald Reagan in late November 1981. Consequently, during the 1980s, Central America became the main focus of governments in the Western Hemisphere, as East-West conflicts spread geographically, and politically outside of the region.   International attention toward the conflict-torn region and the threat of full scale war led to the creation of the Contadora Group in 1983, spearheaded by Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, and Panama (EU Commission, 2002). The efforts of the Contadora Group established the foundation for the Esquipulas peace process, and the eventual cessation of conflicts in the 1990s.   As low-intensity warfare had become the norm in the 1960s and 1970s; US policy came face to face with growing opposition in the 1980s; U.S. actions violated the hemispheric principle of coexistence, self-determination, and non-intervention (Munoz and Tulchin, 1996: 112-113[JP1] ). While meeting on the Panamanian island of Contadora, dialogue began, resulting in agreement to advance the “Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America” (Munoz and Tulchin, 1996: 112-113). [JP2] Although this initiative garnered international support through its recognition of the links between peace, democracy, and development, the process ultimately was undermined by the U.S., which opposed the Contadora Group’s backing of the Nicaraguan Contras.   The Reagan Administration refused to cooperate with the Contadora Group on the basis that it was not a party to the conflicts. Ronald Reagan “described the region’s problems as a “Soviet-Cuban power play-pure and simple;” and concluded in front of a joint session of Congress in April 1983: “the national security of all the Americas is at stake in Central America” (Maguire and Brown, 1986: 309). [JP3] The Reagan Administration’s preoccupation with the Monroe Doctrine led it to proclaim that any incursions into America’s backyard would be dealt with, by force, if necessary (Hook and Spanier, 2000: 212). [JP4] Six months later, the U.S. invaded the small Caribbean island of Grenada in “Operation Urgent Fury,” further destabilizing the region. Although US actions undermined the Contadora Group’s initiative, the Group’s efforts led to a wider coalition that included Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay, known as the Contadora Support Group. The Contadora Group, rather than being viewed as a prospect for peace, was viewed as a threat to US interests, prolonging conflict.   US intervention in the region, its backing of the Nicaraguan Contras, and right wing groups in El Salvador, is relevant for two reasons: first, in the early 1980s, the US used Honduras as a staging ground to support the Nicaraguan counter-revolution, fighting a proxy war in the region against the Soviet Union, placing it in opposition to members of the Contadora Group. The directive made the process of demobilization in Nicaragua a US priority, although the US had trained, armed, and backed the majority of the Somoza regime, which became the Contra forces the US had put into play against the Nicaraguan Sandinistas” (Booth and Walker: 1993: 150). [JP5] Second, the US was using Honduras as a base to fight the ‘communist insurgency’ led by a leftist ‘guerrilla’ movement in El Salvador.   The US acquired political support during the 1980s by providing large sums of economic and military aid. Military, economic, and political incentives were used to ensure the support of military leaders, and the political elite, for US policy interests. During this period, DOD and the CIA were “financing, arming, and training parties in armed conflict” (Utting: 245). [JP6]   The Reagan Administration funded the Contras through arms sales to Iran; the story broke in 1986 (Wienberg, 1991: 70). [JP7] The amount of  “funds that reached the Contras from arms sales to Iran, or from other external miscellaneous sources, are not known precisely. It has been estimated that by 1989 direct US military aid totaled over $400 million” (Booth and Walker, 1993: 71[JP8] ). In 1986 alone, the US spent over $100 million to support fighters in El Salvador. Aid provided to Honduras was $1.6 billion between 1980 and 1990, $711 million of which were Economic Support Funds (ESF). These funds provided the US with enormous influence throughout the region: over state allocations, macroeconomic, agricultural, and natural resource policies (Robinson, 2003: 125).   U.S. rhetorical commitments to democracy were further undermined in 1989 when the first Bush Administration dispatched 20,000 US troops to remove Manuel Noriega from power in Panama (Skidmore and Smith: 2001: 329). As the Central American region experienced violent conflicts: demobilization in the 1980s and early-1990s exacerbated the violence. Despite the role of US intervention in fueling conflict and violence in the region during the 1980s, throughout the 1990s, the US ultimately sought greater stability through neoliberal integration as it began exploiting vulnerabilities in the region’s resource dependent economies. Demobilization did not end until the mid-1990s.