Authors: 1st Author: Dr. Matthew Wilburn King 2nd Author: Dr. Marco Gonzalez 3rd Author: Mauricio Castro 4th Author: Carlos Manuel Rodriguez   Background: The Road to Peace    In this chapter we analyze environmental governance and peacebuilding in post-conflict Central America from the 1980s to the present. We evaluate the experiences of the Central American Commission on Environment and Development (CCAD), which in February 1989, following the Esquipulas peace process, was the first institution to be established by the region’s Presidents as a part of regional integration.   The CCAD was created as an Inter-Parliamentary Commission to coordinate policies, programs, and environmental legislation; and work toward economic, social, and environmental sustainability through the creation of a regional cooperative mechanism for “optimal and rational utilization” of natural resources, the control of pollution, and the restoration of ecological equilibrium. Ties established through CCAD-related dialogue played a critical role in the creation of the Central American System for Regional Integration (SICA), initiated in 1991 through the Tegucigalpa Protocol (Robinson, 2003: 65). CCAD now acts as the environmental branch of the younger SICA, but as an Inter-Parliamentary body, it is specifically designed to convene actors for the purpose of collaboration on both environment and development related matters.   CCAD serves as the Secretariat for regional international agreements on the environment. Comprised of government representatives from each party, and supported by a Secretariat and various Ad-hoc Technical Commissions, the CCAD serves as an important inter-parliamentary forum for nation-states to address economic development and local livelihood issues. Its creation has demonstrated that the “environment has become a fundamental factor in security issues in many regions already, and in the future will increasingly lie at the heart of security concerns of nations around the world” (Norman Myers, 1993: 17[JP1] ). We explore the current trends toward better forms of environmental governance that have furthered peace and stability in post-conflict Central America.   The Esquipulas peace process, named for the Guatemalan town where the peace talks began, was the result of Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez’s efforts, alongside the UN Security Council, the General Assembly, other international and regional organizations. Elected to the Presidency of Costa Rica in 1986, Arias was able to forge peace through his own determination and diplomacy. He successfully persuaded Central American governments to reach agreement to: cease-fire; dialogue with opposition movements; prevent the use of territory for aggressive purposes, and cease and prohibit aid to irregular forces (Munoz and Tulchin, 1996: 117). [JP2] Ultimately, it was the process initiated by President Arias that led to the signing of the Esquipulas II Accords by five Central American presidents in 1987. By 1992, civil conflict had ended in all Central American countries except Guatemala, where the civil war did not end until 1996 (Steinberg, et al., 2003: 6).[JP3]   Following the adoption of the Esquipulas II Accords, the Central American presidents met regularly to track progress and address issues in the implementation of the peace process. The presidents were motivated by mutual awareness of the “profound interdependence” among the countries of the region, the pernicious effects of previous approaches to development, and the certainty that “a regional system for the use of natural resources is a fundamental factor for the creation of a lasting peace” (Arias: CITE). [JP4] Ten months later, at their sixth meeting, the presidents of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua signed the Constitutive Convention for the Central American Commission for Environment and Development, leading to the creation of the CCAD. Belize and Panama joined the Convention in 1991, while The Dominican Republic’s affiliation with CCAD was codified in 2005 upon signing the US-Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR).   The grand achievement of Esquipulas II was peace through nonviolent means, earning President Arias the Nobel Peace Prize. The Accords aimed to end hostilities, promote democratization, spur negotiation of arms control agreements, and assist refugees at a regional level. In August 1987 Central America agreed on free elections, and the democratization of all nations: “a Central American solution to a Central American problem” (Skidmore and Smith: 2003: 332). Subsequently, Central American governments have sought to prevent and mitigate the likelihood of exacerbating tensions within and between states, civil society, and the private sector through environmental governance. However, the region did not experience relative peace and stability until violent conflicts ceased in Panama, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala in the late 1980s and 1990s.   The lack of mechanisms to channel social conflicts demanded new institutional arrangements in the context of rapid socioeconomic change. By the end of the 1990s, the most dominant policy trajectories in the region were neoliberalization and democratization. As democratization took hold, new institutional arrangements emerged that have enabled “groups with opposed interests to come together, conduct dialogues, negotiate, and strike deals” (Annis, 1992a, 1992b; Arias and Nations, 1992; Cox, 1992; Utting: 250).[JP5]  The inclusion of civil society, in the context of democratic and neoliberal transformations, is central to ensure that the road ahead leads toward greater peace and stability.   Neoliberal economic reforms pursued during the 1980s were not aligned with democratic transitions that had begun with the Kennedy Administration’s Alliance for Progress. The tumultuous nature of democratic change between the 1960s and the 1990s should not be equated with political instability, nor instability with nonviolent pressures applied to increase a particular group’s share of economic or political power” (Maguire and Brown, 1986: 326). Theories that link violent conflict and the environment have recently come to the fore in the context of neoliberalization, and are worth noting. The debates generally fall into two categories.   The first is the environmental security literature (Baechler[JP6]  1998, Kaplan [JP7] 1994, Homer-Dixon 1990, [JP8] 1993) and concerns itself with violence resulting from the degradation of the natural environment (Peluso and Watts 2001). This literature tends to focus on the relations between environmental scarcity and degradation, and its contribution to large-scale structural violence, and is often state-centric. The second focuses on the relationships between local level violence and the socio-historical contexts where they occur, as well as macro level processes that affect power dynamics; this approach lies within the tradition of political ecology. Political ecologists critique the former approach as being neo-Malthusian by directing its lens towards environmentally determinist explanations of violence, while ignoring political and social variables (Hecht 1985[JP9] , Peluso and Watts 2001). Political ecology of violence theory reverses the direction of the relationship between the environment and violence, broadly focusing on violence against people and the environment (Peluso and Watts 2003).[JP10]   In Central America peacebuilding has been predicated on recognizing the links between security concerns, such as armed violence, as well as resource degradation. Importantly, it must be recognized that civil conflicts can be exacerbated as a consequence of resource degradation, or in some cases incites violence. It is worth remembering scarcity can contribute to civil violence through resource capture, generally by “elites” and/or “ecological marginalization” of vulnerable or disenfranchised people” (Peluso and Watts, 2001: 13).   We acknowledge that environmental factors play direct and indirect roles in both political disputes and violent conflicts. Therefore, we concentrate on the relationship between governance and the environment in relation to peacebuilding in post-conflict CA. Given that the region’s “income derives mainly from natural resources that support agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and hydro-power energy; environmental health is vital to the region’s economic well-being, and in turn to its political stability” (Norman Myers, 130: 1993).[JP11]   Access to and control over natural resources have been central to development debates since the 1990s, particularly at the international level. However, political, social, and economic progress in CA have depended on the management of natural resources; “the backbone of the region’s economies, accounting for more than half of all economic production, half of all employment, and most exports (Maguire and Brown [Nations & Leonard], 1986: 57[JP12] ). We uncover how the increased focus on export led growth has the potential to undermine democratic participation, revealing neoliberalism’s weaker anti-democratic tendencies, and the role of the CCAD and civil society in post-conflict CA.   The following sections more fully explain the origins and nature of the CCAD, clearly position it within the literature, and the broader peace process. For the purposes of this chapter, ‘broader peace process’ will refer to neoliberal reforms and democratic transformations, both components of regional integration in Central America throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The peace process will refer to the negotiations leading up to the beginning of post-conflict Central America, the cessation of civil war in Guatemala in 1996 the demarcation. The broader peace process to date will refer to the deepening of regional integration. The strengthening of regional institutions has become a priority under political reform efforts, leading to an era of peacebuilding through environmental governance in post-conflict Central America. Our goal is to illuminate how “integrating natural resource management and environmental governance within peacebuilding plans and strategies” has contributed toward stability in Central America.   In addition to answering questions of what happened, and how, we address the outcomes of various CCAD initiatives, the challenges, and what might be done to overcome them in the decade ahead. Although we provide descriptive aspects of policy developments, and the functions of various institutions, analysis of CCAD’s initiatives in the broader peacebuilding context remains central, rather than its specific role in any specific environmental governance forum.  We narrow our focus on the CCAD for the purpose of contributing to the UN Peacebuilding Commission’s “Roadmap for Action in 2011;” we describe what the road has looked like, and describe what’s up ahead.   We begin by elucidating regional conflicts during the 1980s and 1990s; discuss regional interventions, particularly the role of the US; describe the road to peace in post-conflict Central America; and introduce the CCAD; specifically, its role in peacebuilding through environmental governance. We then address, individually, seven strategies that have contributed to the CCAD’s success in peacebuilding through over the last two decades.   Central American Regional Conflicts 1980s and 1990s Central American states have had a long history of internal conflicts. Historically, Central American states have been “relatively weak, with regular political violence, and rare cases of democracy (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 28[JP13] 1). The challenges were made even clearer by Octavio Paz, who wrote; “peace and democracy have been fragile curiosities; our norms are tyranny or civil war” (Maguire and Brown, 1986: 312-313)[JP14] . The consequences of militarization, characterized by constant repression, and unrepresentative political systems took a massive toll on the region during these periods. Political violence and external involvement in the 1980s had particularly negative effects (Ed. Munoz and Tulchin, 1996: 108-112). [JP15] Countries have experienced numerous setbacks along the long road to peace and democracy, as fragile governance institutions have risked falling victim to disorganization, manipulation, and corruption, “democracy provides no guarantee for peace and stability” (Wijkman, Anders [JP16] 1998).   We concentrate on the conflicts of these two periods, highlighting the characteristics of the conflicts in the 1980s and the emergence of post-conflict Central America in the 1990s. Our goal is to elucidate the emergence of the CCAD in context. The following sections consider CCAD’s role in the region, evaluating its successes, and the constraints related to peacebuilding. Subsequently, we situate the role of the CCAD within the social, economic, and political processes that have contributed to social and environmental decline, as well as instability. Although countries in the Central American region take their nationality seriously, “nationalism,” it was said;  “is an ailment of the big countries,” integration the way forward (Ed. Mildred Adams: 1963: 233). [JP17] The creation of the CCAD exemplified the culmination of processes toward regional integration pursued for decades.   Between the 1950s and the end of the Cold War, the overly exaggerated threat of communism led numerous US administrations to intervene in CA on the basis of the doctrine of national security. The trend continued with US National Security Decision Directive Number 17 signed by Ronald Reagan in late November 1981. Consequently, during the 1980s, Central America became the main focus of governments in the Western Hemisphere, as East-West conflicts spread geographically, and politically outside of the region. It is clear that once the Cold War ended in 1989, that the “ideology of the “free market” began to replace anti-communism as an instrument for the elite ‘to address’ the economic demands of the poor and the oppressed” (Walker and Armony, 2000: 214-215). [JP18] Consequently, profound transformations to CA’s political economy have reconfigured states, classes, and civil society through conflicting processes that are socio-historically contingent.   International attention toward the conflict-torn region and the threat of full scale war led to the creation of the Contadora Group in 1983, spearheaded by Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, and Panama (EU Commission, 2002). The efforts of the Contadora Group established the foundation for the Esquipulas peace process, and the eventual cessation of conflicts in the 1990s.   As low-intensity warfare had become the norm in the 1960s and 1970s; US policy came face to face with growing opposition in the 1980s; U.S. actions violated the hemispheric principle of coexistence, self-determination, and non-intervention (Munoz and Tulchin, 1996: 112-113[JP19] ). While meeting on the Panamanian island of Contadora, dialogue began, resulting in agreement to advance the “Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America” (Munoz and Tulchin, 1996: 112-113). [JP20] Although this initiative garnered international support through its recognition of the links between peace, democracy, and development, the process ultimately was undermined by the U.S., which opposed the Contadora Group’s backing of the Nicaraguan Contras.   The Reagan Administration refused to cooperate with the Contadora Group on the basis that it was not a party to the conflicts. Ronald Reagan “described the region’s problems as a “Soviet-Cuban power play-pure and simple;” and concluded in front of a joint session of Congress in April 1983: “the national security of all the Americas is at stake in Central America” (Maguire and Brown, 1986: 309). [JP21] The Reagan Administration’s preoccupation with the Monroe Doctrine led it to proclaim that any incursions into America’s backyard would be dealt with, by force, if necessary (Hook and Spanier, 2000: 212). [JP22] Six months later, the U.S. invaded the small Caribbean island of Grenada in “Operation Urgent Fury,” further destabilizing the region. Although US actions undermined the Contadora Group’s initiative, the Group’s efforts led to a wider coalition that included Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay, known as the Contadora Support Group. The Contadora Group, rather than being viewed as a prospect for peace, was viewed as posing a threat to US interests.   US intervention in the region, its backing of the Nicaraguan Contras, and right wing groups in El Salvador, is relevant for two reasons: first, in the early 1980s, the US used Honduras as a staging ground to support the Nicaraguan counter-revolution, fighting a proxy war in the region against the Soviet Union, placing it in opposition to members of the Contadora Group. The directive made the process of demobilization in Nicaragua a US priority, although the US had trained, armed, and backed the majority of the Somoza regime, which became the Contra forces the US had put into play against the Nicaraguan Sandinistas” (Booth and Walker: 1993: 150). [JP23] Second, the US was using Honduras as a base to fight the ‘communist insurgency’ led by a leftist ‘guerrilla’ movement in El Salvador.   The US acquired political support during the 1980s by providing large sums of economic and military aid. Military, economic, and political incentives were used to ensure the support of military leaders, and the political elite, for US policy interests. During this period, DOD and the CIA were “financing, arming, and training parties in armed conflict” (Utting: 245). [JP24] The Reagan Administration funded the Contras through arms sales to Iran; the story broke in 1986 (Wienberg, 1991: 70). [JP25] The amount of  “funds that reached the Contras from arms sales to Iran, or from other external miscellaneous sources, are not known precisely. It has been estimated that by 1989 direct US military aid totaled over $400 million” (Booth and Walker, 1993: 71[JP26] ). In 1986 alone, the US spent over $100 million to support fighters in El Salvador. Aid provided to Honduras was $1.6 billion between 1980 and 1990, $711 million of which were Economic Support Funds (ESF). These funds provided the US with enormous influence throughout the region: over state allocations, macroeconomic, agricultural, and natural resource policies (Robinson, 2003: 125).   U.S. commitments to democracy were further undermined in 1989 when the first Bush Administration dispatched 20,000 US troops to remove Manuel Noriega from power in Panama (Skidmore and Smith: 2001: 329). As the Central American region experienced violent conflicts: demobilization in the 1980s and early-1990s exacerbated the violence. Despite the role of US intervention in fueling conflict and violence in the region during the 1980s, throughout the 1990s, the US ultimately sought greater stability through neoliberal integration. Demobilization did not end until the mid-1990s.   Environmental Security and Conflict The 1980s was a period of increased environmental degradation and conflict. The neoliberal agro-export model pursued was criticized for having led to the over-exploitation of natural resources. Neoliberal agrarian reform, in particular, was denounced for contributing to massive deforestation, the clear-cutting of lands for agricultural development, and the removal of mangrove forests for aquaculture development along the coasts (Boyer and Pell, 1999: 5). Increased agricultural activity over the previous decades was congruent with higher levels of use of fertilizers, chemicals, and pesticides, leading to contamination of soils and waters. The need for security concerns to be  “balanced against increasingly prominent political, economic, humanitarian, and environmental issues” became clearer as  “old development models failed, leaving weak political systems, still un-diversified economies, much more poverty, and a greatly deteriorated environment in their wake” (Arias, Nations, et al; 1992: vii). [JP27]   The human impacts on the natural environment, the lack of systems of governance, and the possibility for conflict or cooperation, have demanded the strengthening and creation of new institutions. The lack of uneven development and the incongruence between reform efforts has often led to conflict and civil unrest in relation to access and control over natural resources. In Central America, “over the centuries, disputes over access to land – often between powerful landed interests and a dispossessed peasantry – have sometimes led to violence, while the “scarcity of arable land has also led to conflict; in others misdistribution plays a more important role” (Maguire and Brown, 1986: 318-319[JP28] ). Some countries, such as El Salvador, have had both problems.   The goal of U.S. economic policies during the 1980s were to “defuse underlying conflicts; proposing agricultural development to counter the social and ecological problems that spurred Central America’s “revolutionary movements” (Maguire and Brown [JP29] [Nations and Leonard], 1986: 63). Early trade agreements, such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative Act in 1983 (CBI), aligned with early neoliberal reform efforts; “a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well being can best be advanced by liberating entrepreneurial-freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (Harvey, 2005: 2). The advent of market economics had only served to intensify environmental conflicts, as the region pushed to export new products.   Since 1985, CBI has been a unilateral trade preference program, driving the U.S.-Central America relationship (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994: 371). The “Kissinger Commission,” the impetus for the CBI, called for a five year, $8 billion economic development program for the region, leading to a number of initiatives. Rooted in neoliberal ideology, the capitalist transformations that had begun by the 1980s led to an increase in foreign investment, changes in labor market dynamics, and increased pressure on exportable natural resources, leading to further civil unrest. Environmental challenges were increasingly attributed to the over-exploitation of the region’s natural resources as reforms were embraced throughout the 1980s and the 1990s (Skidmore and Smith, 2001: 341).   When it comes to climate insecurity and natural resource scarcity, the vivid memory of the “1969 Soccer War” between El Salvador and Honduras made the challenge between economic decline and degradation acute (fighting started between the two countries after a contentious soccer match). Massive deforestation and impoverishment, resulting from militarization in El Salvador, led to migration into Honduras that caused tensions and, eventually, led to the war (Maguire and Brown [Nations and Leonard], 1986: 62). [JP30] The “Soccer War” had made clear the environmental basis of political stability in Central America, but few actions were taken until the 1980s and 1990s.   The agro-export model’s threat to Central America’s forests has been immense; first, “converting forests to pastureland or agricultural lands undermined the potential long-term benefits that forests provide” (Maguire and Brown, 1986: 79[JP31] ). Second, the impact of agricultural clearance is very clear today in El Salvador. The potential impacts of forest loss, and the lack of forest for various environmental services, such as carbon sequestration, increase the challenges.   Post-Conflict Central America   As peace followed the Esquipulas II Accords, natural resource management helped to create a foundation for regional integration in Central America. The environment provided a politically neutral forum for cooperation, while simultaneously recognizing the environmental basis of political and economic stability. Central American regional integration, to an extent, began with increased cooperation on environmental issues through nascent institutions such as the CCAD.   Following the end of the Cold War, the cessation of most conflicts by 1992, rapid capitalist transformations throughout the 1990s, coupled with a regional governance vacuum, were destabilizing. The dominant model of the 20th Century: traditional, hierarchical, agrarian, and paternalistic, increasingly became urban, industrial, individualistic, and  ‘democratic’ toward the 21st Century (Mildred Adams[JP32] : 1963: 241). We focus on the practices of the CCAD and its role in the post-conflict transition process, considering specifically how cooperation in environmental governance has contributed to short- and long-term peace and stability.   By 1992, the Overseas Development Council recognized that peace and stability in Central America were directly tied to developing better environmental policies that deal head on with reconciling “fiercely competing interests over how resources should be used – or not used ” (Arias and Nations, 1992: viii)[JP33] . Although the Arias Plan presented challenges, plans taking the environment into account in development strategies were needed to “create a lasting peace for the region” (Weinberg, 2001: 146). Nascent neoliberal reforms have, more recently, been targeted as the cause of environmental degradation and deteriorating social conditions, leading civil society to contest the effects. Increased conflict over scarce land, and water resources is highly probable.   The challenge confronting most governments in the context of neoliberal reform are the huge disparities between rich and poor, which has the potential to trigger or reopen political rifts (Renne[JP34] r: 1996: 87). One of the challenges of natural resource governance in the context of ‘free markets’ is focusing on “the basic needs of affected populations before the political agendas and profits of their domestic elites, businesses, and consuming countries” (Le Billon, Philippe, 216: In Bannon and Collier, 2003). [JP35] Transboundary natural resource issues, and territorial disputes, have required greater regional cooperation as tensions between the elites and the campesino have increased. In the decades ahead, the future is laden with potential conflicts that may result from impacts due to climate change.   Regional institutions, such as the CCAD, have performed a vital role in navigating the politics of environment and development in post-conflict Central America, from the 1990s to the present. Mitigating impacts, preventing conflict and violence, while diminishing the potential for ‘environmental refugees’ is going to be an important role for the CCAD.   Paving the Way: The Role of the CCAD in Environmental Governance and Peacebuilding  The CCAD has been successful in formulating strategies to promote environmentally sustainable development. Although sustainable development is a highly contested concept, its power is packed in its rhetorical vagueness; a “concept”, critics say; “is favored by policymakers because it obscures ideological differences about the causes of ecological destruction, and what should be done about them” (Collinson, 1997: 8). During the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg, it was recognized that Central America benefited in the post-conflict context of the 1990s.   As the peace process unfolded, governments recognized that institutions and organizations within nations, and within the region often function in isolation from one another, thereby stultifying the advancement of regional interests in international forums. As a result, the CCAD has sought to perform a central role in inter-governmental dialogues in the context of democratization and neoliberal economic integration.   CCAD’s experiences facilitating regional conventions, and consensus-based agendas on environmental issues have led to numerous institutional arrangements to secure political stability through environmental governance. CCAD has supported a series of conventions on issues, and advanced an environmental agenda as a part of its regional foreign policy. Conflict and civil unrest in CA has been difficult to mollify in light of the weak presence of government bodies in geographically isolated regions. As the environmental basis of political and economic stability become clearer toward the end of the 1990s, the strengthening of new institutional frameworks to address transboundary natural resource issues must be a priority to prevent further conflicts.   CCAD performs a critical role in supporting and participating in dialogues related to international conventions relevant to its Member States. CCAD is charged with directing and administering Convention regimes to achieve Member State objectives, most often in relation to international treaties that fall within their purview. CCAD ensures that Member States that have signed conventions ratify and then implement agreements. Similar to non-state actors, such as Conservation International, the CCAD has no voting power in inter-governmental forums, but is given space to voice a regional position.   CCAD Ministers have Official Observer status in various forums; however, individual nation-states are the only actors that have the power to ratify international treaties and conventions, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Agreements reached through the CCAD can be overridden by any nation-state’s president or, in El Salvador, the Foreign Affairs Office, potentially undermining their legitimacy from the outset (Carlos Manuel Rodriguez). CCAD is now known internationally, participating as an Observer in the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Its Members States have signed the CBD, and actively contribute to global initiatives, such as the Global Water Partnership (GWP) and Global Environmental Outlook (GEO). Each has strengthened the CCAD’s legitimacy; however, its power and authority to effect change is currently limited, and entirely dependent on advancing shared regional interests, most often by consensus. The major achievements of the CCAD include, but are not limited to, the creation of:  

• Alliance for Sustainable Development (ALIDES),
• Central American Civil Society Forum on Environment and Development; and its associated Fund (FOSCAD/FOSCADES), and
• Environmental Plan for the Central American Region (PARCA).

  The CCAD’s role in the creation and establishment of ALIDES, PARCA, FOSCADES, and PROARCA has demonstrated its commitment to collaborative environmental governance between the state, civil society, and the private sector. With the majority of financial support originating from outside actors, the CCAD has been able to leverage a number of resources. The financing of CCAD efforts eventually led to the formation of the Regional Environmental Program for Central America in 1995 (PROARCA), $25 million originating from USAID to cover a five year period (CONCAUSA, July 1998[JP36] ). Since the 1990s, “USAID has taken a leading role in environmental protection initiatives in the region”. Both efforts have required strengthened institutions, and new democratic forums for addressing grievances.   CCAD set forth a number of ambitious objectives from its outset in Central America (CA); we assess CCAD ‘s efforts and their practical impact. We offer lessons from the past two decades of CCAD experience, illuminating crosscutting lessons that may be applicable in other regions where democratic transformations are taking place. Where possible, we incorporate specific and concrete examples. We do not examine the role of other institutions and organizations, or their specific role in peacebuilding in post-conflict CA, with the exception of elucidating their contextual relevance. We have identified seven strategies related to CCAD’s efforts that have contributed to greater peace and stability, before and after the cessation of conflicts in the mid-1990s, summarized as:  

• Advancing shared interests in the pursuit of regional cooperation for sustainable development;
• Strengthening civil society through increased democratic participation;
• Catalyzing the strengths of multiple institutions as exemplified in the creation of Alliance for Sustainable Development (ALIDES);
• Creating greater continuity and permanence by establishing an Environmental Plan for Central America (PARCA);
• Establishing and strengthening the Central American Civil Society Forum on Environment and Development (FOSCADES), composed of regional state, private sector, and civil society actors
• Open avenues for actors to take part in the process of designing and making decisions on regional environmental policies (PROARCA); and
• Establishing the Central American Fund for Sustainable Development (FOSCADES), the cornerstone of CCAD donor related initiatives (a.k.a. Donors Forum).

  Each of these initiatives has contributed toward peace and security in Central America.  Throughout, we attempt to make the challenges related to each strategy transparent, suggest solutions, and offer further considerations related to regional environmental governance.   Advancing Shared Interests: Regional Cooperation for Sustainable Development  By the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Brazil, CCAD had a consensus-based Central American Agenda on Environment and Development, which was presented at the conference. The region’s unified approach to UNCED had strengthened the Commission’s credibility.   The following year, the Regional Convention on Climate Change (1993) and the Regional Convention for the Management and Conservation of Natural Forest Ecosystems (1993) were signed. Regional agreements include the Convention on the Conservation of Biodiversity; Protection of Priority Wildlife Areas (1992); and the Regional Agreement on Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes (1992); each country ratified, or approved the outcomes of these conventions as a result of CCAD efforts (Gonzalez, 1999).   As the peace process unfolded, governments recognized that institutions and organizations within nations, and within the region, often function in isolation from one another preventing their ability to advance collective interests in international forums. Since the 1990s, CCAD has identified three major themes for its regional programs: conservation and sustainable use of natural heritage, pollution control and prevention, and institutional strengthening of the Commission through Member States. The CCAD has promoted and coordinated action among government agencies, NGOs, and international organizations. An important contribution of the CCAD has been the convening of regional actors to address environmental challenges.   By 1997, all seven countries had signed the Kyoto Protocol – UN Convention on Climate Change, demonstrating the power of CCAD’s coordinating efforts in reaching consensus on concerns of regional importance (CONCAUSA in Action, July 1998[JP37] ). The Central American Council on Forests was created to address the impacts of deforestation; bringing forest service directors, “regional networks of farmers’ unions, forest-based industry organizations, and women’s environmental groups” together (Page and Schwarz, 1996: 5). It became clear to a wide set of actors that “the basic development model of the past – in which the elite used politics to convert natural resources to personal wealth and more clout – was no longer sustainable” (Arias and Nations: 1992: 15). [JP38]   Strengthening Civil Society Along the road to peace, the CCAD has collaborated with civil society to bring increased attention to the environment of Central America, and how it ought to be utilized, managed, or conserved. Inter-governmental bodies, such as the CCAD have supported collaboration and cooperation, while it has also promoted and supported civil society organizations. Over the last two decades a “broadening range of social actors – including the poor – have become engaged in debate and decision making, while democracy has taken on more practical meaning beyond nominal elections” (Arias and Nations: 1992: 5). [JP39] By strengthening civil society to focus on livelihood issues, economic development, food security, and democratic participation, the CCAD has paved the way toward greater peace and stability through environmental governance.   Increasingly, however, the governments, international financial institutions, and the private interests behind neoliberal change have become the target of organizations opposed to the  “Washington Consensus” (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994: 371). The reaction from within civil society to structural adjustment and severe austerity measures, led Heads of state to meet in San Salvador on 30 March 1995 to sign a Treaty on Central American Social Integration, which included text regarding environmental protection (Article 6), which was consistent with Article 8 of the Tegucigalpa Protocol, which outlines achieving “sustainable development for the Central American population” (Gonzalez, 1999). The Measure sought to recognize the role of NGOs within the region, and increase the participation of civil society.   The scaling up of the environmental movement in Central America, and internationally, paralleled the rise of neoliberal economic reforms in the region. Non-state actors affiliated with the global environmental movement have successfully taken the local debates into the national, regional, and international arenas. Thus, public participation has been a focus of the CCAD, governments, and institutions, consistent with the transition toward democratic participation.  Democratic transformation opened up the possibility for the creation of a plethora of organizations in the 1980s. The United Nations Development Program estimates that over 50,000 NGOs were created in the 1980s, and over 29,000 international NGOs by 1995 (Robinson, 2003: 227).   The strengthening of civil society can be attributed to outside support from non-state actors. Old grievances related to human rights and labor practices were aligned with environmental concerns, and advocated more assertively through the early formation of transnational political networks. The nascent environmental movement during the 1980s, although geographically dispersed, eventually began to consolidate, leading to stronger links between movements in Central America and outside of the region.   In 1987, prior to Esquipulas II, a number of newly created NGOs in the region met in Managua, Nicaragua, holding the First Central American Conference on Environmental Action. The Conference resulted in the creation of the Regional Network of Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations for Sustainable Development in Central America (REDES) (Weinberg 1991: 143). REDES was exemplary of new forms of civic action and public participation in the absence of institutions focused on environmental governance, particularly as local movements collectively organized on a regional scale. Nascent democratic institutions have often been incapable of addressing environmental conflicts, civil society attempted to fill the gaps as reforms exacerbated tensions. New institutions and civil society organizations, like REDES, have created the space for dialogue, negotiations, and resolutions on key issues. The degrees to which these organizations influenced leaders, or increased their political will to create the CCAD is uncertain, but it could be a contribution to the social movement literature.   The CCAD’s formation has made it possible for states to collaborate with non-state actors on a regional basis. It also provides space for governments and other relevant decision makers to seek input from civil society. As newly formed ministries implement environmental legislation (see PARCA) and address livelihood issues; continued peace is dependent on extending prosperity, but the rural poor often remain marginalized. Davis has argued that rural communities and their citizens can be marginalized from, or connected to state institutions, policies, practices, and even discourses; geographically, culturally, institutionally, and by social class (Davis, 1999: 603). Instability and political conflict often increase in the midst of rapid socio-economic change as; “attitudes change, aspirations rise, frustrations with the status quo increase, and social conflicts among newly emergent groups multiply” (Gary Wynia, 1978: 317). Cooperation among actors, particularly in relation to natural resources, remains vital to a democratic future in post-conflict Central America.   Most of the rural citizenry remain too geographically distant from centers of power to effect large-scale change, making it challenging for the CCAD to enact policy and legislation relevant to more immediate livelihood issues (see PARCA). As globalization has gained pace, it has “primarily benefited countries, communities, companies, and individuals with capital, technological know-how, and entrepreneurial skills; whereas the rural poor have remained on the periphery (Renner: 1996: 78[JP40] ). The most important role in mitigating future conflicts is dependent identifying priority areas, including: watershed protection, tropical forest management, pollution control, and the import and management of toxic and hazardous waste.   As neoliberal reform gained pace throughout the region in the 1990s, newly formed democracies provided space for civil society to collectively advance interests, and contest the ‘real’ and perceived impacts of macro-economic and political changes. Civil society’s power relative to the state and the private sector have increased during the 1980s and 1990s as democratic transformations have occurred, providing ordinary people greater access to negotiate the future use, management, and conservation of Central America’s natural resources.   The numerous environmental organizations that emerged during the 1980s were indicative of the democratic spaces opening up in the region, but the transition, and the renewal of civil society in the 1990s strengthened efforts toward peace and stability. State processes of decentralization have been pursued assertively to continue connecting rural communities and those making political decisions that affect their livelihoods. ALIDES, PARCA, FOSCAD/FOSCADES, and PROARCA have been important regional initiatives in this regard, and instrumental in peacebuilding processes.   Catalyzing the Strengths of Multiple Institutions – ALIDES  The CCAD has taken a more active role catalyzing the strengths of multiple institutions in order to address shared resource issues, thereby promoting participatory, democratic, and decentralized environmental management. The Alliance for Sustainable Development (ALIDES), under the umbrella of SICA, has as one of its four principle priorities “sustainable management of natural resources and improving environmental quality” (CONCAUSA 1998)[MD41] . ALIDES was created as an institutional framework to address those issues that the CCAD itself could not, primarily due to its financial limitations as an inter-parliamentary body. The CCAD convened with CA Presidents to identify gaps and innovate to address the problems of coordinating and financing efforts.   In the early 1990s, the CCAD sought to address these two challenges through the formation of ALIDES. By doing so, Central American Presidents agreed in 1994 to create a body that linked the environment with other regional initiatives pursued by ministries with differing legislative authorities (see PARCA), leading to the creation of ALIDES. Attributed to the efforts of nascent environmental ministries and organizations, CCAD’s role in the formation of ALIDES was directed toward more actively addressing environmental governance challenges on a regional scale. ALIDES now aims to promote human development, economic growth, and social justice, focusing on the development of a management structure for the promotion and the protection of the environment (EU Commission, 2002).   CONCAUSA As new Ministries were created, it became clear that a number of CA governments were duplicating efforts to address environmental issues, lacked the capacity to leverage resources, and confronted high costs as initiatives were often pursued in isolation. The CCAD, and collaborating Ministries of Environment began work with extra-regional governments, aid agencies, multi-laterals, and NGOs to implement political strategies and programs focused on promoting the conservation of natural resources through environmental cooperation, and regional integration. With the signing of the Central America-US Joint Accord on Biodiversity, Energy, Environmental Legislation, Trade and Investment in 1994 (CONCAUSA 1994), [MD42] the U.S. became the first extra-regional member of ALIDES.   CONCAUSA established four major areas of action: conservation of biodiversity, sound use of energy, environmental legislation, and sustainable economic development (CONCAUSA, 1998). [MD43] The plan of action included the goal to strengthen enforcement of environmental legislation, while improving the harmonization of regional environmental laws (See PARCA). Participation through CONCAUSA solidified U.S. commitment to and involvement in the environmental, and regional integration efforts of Central America – a vital step forward given the United States’ strong influence and troubled history in the region.   Continuity and Regional Agendas – PARCA The CCAD has recognized that a number of projects in the region lack continuity and a presence that undermines continuity and the institution’s ability to monitor long-term programs. We suggest expanding CCAD’s institutional arrangements to bridge the gap between environmental policy and real world outcomes. Natural resource management programs, and legislation, providing the authority for governments to act, have been passed, although these are the exception rather than the norm. Economic development continues to dominate all other goals, including conservation efforts. In a number of cases where national policies have existed to protect the environment, they were rarely applied and, in some cases, entirely ignored by the government and the private sector. State failure to protect the environment and local livelihoods led to further civil unrest. Consequently, strengthening democracy, governance, and the rule of law were paramount to the region’s development, the protection of the environment, and continued peace and stability.   As Central American governments began establishing new environmental policies, the CCAD recognized the need for a regional plan, resulting in the first Environmental Plan for Central America (PARCA). As the CCAD became more actively engaged throughout the 1990s, it took the lead convening and formulating PARCA – a strategy for mid- and long-term regional environmental challenges, while also developing an operating plan to enact its goals. The first PARCA was published in 1999; designed to build capacity to address the region’s environmental challenges through the establishment of five-year plans. The CCAD’s efforts toward continuity in programming, and a greater commitment toward integrating otherwise isolated resource management efforts, are still pursued through PARCA’s legal aims.   CCAD member countries, more-often-than-not, adopt bodies of legislation in accordance with guidelines prepared by the Commission for Programs on Environmental Legislation (PROLEGIS), which has sought to harmonize environmental law in accord with the Central American Parliament (PARLACEN) (Marco Gonzalez, 2011[MD44] ). Strengthening the national institutions responsible for managing natural resources and environmental protection has been a consistent CCAD contribution. CCAD’s achievements are particularly notable given provisions permitting governments to undertake planning, land reform, and orient economic activity toward specific objectives is only as recent as the 1950s and 1960s (Mildred Adams: 1963: 261)[MD45] . As governments seek to harmonize environmental laws two goals must be achieved.   First, fostering compatibility between major policies and national legislation with regional strategies for sustainable development. Second, governments must incorporate environmental considerations, and regulations into the process of national development planning to strengthen regional cooperation on issues from the outset. The inclusion of planning at the regional level, rather than the State, provides an alternative to statism and creates a means to involve wider publics beyond national identity (Mildred Adams: 1963: 262). The human and financial resources have not been available for this aspect of institutional strengthening; and “project teams usually lack social scientists who could contribute to the multidisciplinary base of information required for designing appropriate methodologies” (Utting: 247)[MD46] . CCAD’s efforts to imagine new eco-regions as a part of its continuous identity formation process (see PROARCA) are exemplary of regional actors’ efforts to move beyond national identity.   While CCAD has succeeded in standardizing and improving environmental and natural resource management in the region, particularly in regard to legislation, it is important to note that success has been predicated on financing from outside of the region. Future investments must ensure that concepts like sustainable development and participation do not remain at the level of rhetoric, and become translated into concrete laws and policies that promote and enforce efforts toward conservation (Utting: 249). [MD47]   Currently, numerous governmental bodies support each country’s individual capacities to apply and enforce environmental legislation in accord with national laws. However, CCAD has no ability to enforce compliance with international agreements, or national laws, which are rarely monitored or evaluated given their adolescence. Although environmental attorneys are burgeoning, as new enforcement offices are established, community planners and development specialists are needed to avoid the creation of a technocratic and litigious culture, particularly since the goal is to move away from adversarial approaches when addressing conflict.   Despite greater environmental awareness and higher levels of regional participation, CCAD has been unable to fully implement and enforce the objectives of various conventions, which often conflict with more important agricultural, economic, and trade related concerns. However, the global conventions concluded since 1992 have prompted a number of important institutional changes and innovative cooperative mechanisms to address issues in the region. Most countries have set up specific bodies, such as commissions, institutes, or national programs to address environmental issues. Nations, donors, and lending institutions also promote policies and implementation plans that attempt to mainstream the environment in key economic sectors, including water, forestry, tourism, and energy.   Most countries in the region are still attempting to get a handle on environmental legislation, much less fully enact it with appropriate funding. The gap between policy and legislation, and between legal mandates and realities on the ground, are difficult to determine at such an early stage. In the future, examination of the degree to which legal reality is congruent with local level realities will be important, since this very challenge is one of CCAD’s mandates. The adoption of new policies, and the creation of national legislation is a current priority; but the obstacles related to adapting legislation, in accord with the reality on the ground, has been a persistent challenge since the 1960s (Mildred Adams: 1963: 261).  [MD48]   Building a Solid Foundation – FOSCADES  Regional cooperation has been strengthened due to the strategic nature of CCAD’s institutional design process, and willingness to devolve power through newly created institutions. Recognizing the backlash against initiatives in the 1990s, projects that seemed rhetorical vs. actuated, CCAD established two permanent mechanisms for consultation: the Central American Civil Society Forum on Environment and Development (FOSCAD), composed of regional state, private sector, and civil society actors. These actors take part in the process of designing and making decisions on regional environmental policies relevant to PARCA. The second, the Central American Fund for Sustainable Development (FOSCADES) became the cornerstone of CCAD donor related initiatives (a.k.a. Donors Forum). We refer to FOSCADES in reference to both, since the latter is the financial mechanism by which actions are taken.   The Donors Forum was established by CCAD to act as the financial mechanism for the implementation of regional environmental strategies and policies beyond any one state’s jurisdiction. In 1996, a number of Technical Committees had been created to advise and monitor projects on key environmental themes and work toward international agreements, but financing was not carefully coordinated.   The CCAD’s mandate to coordinate FOSCADES through a board and a director has provided governments with opportunities to leverage financial resources toward achieving regional goals. Through the Donors’ Forum, since 2000, members have secured over $15 million for various initiatives in the Central American region.   Managing the collection of regional and international financial resources needed to achieve its objectives, CCAD has mobilized efforts through the Donors Forum. The CCAD has broadened and strengthened its operational and administrative financial base, obtaining donor funding from the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) to complement USAID ‘s investments, through initiatives like PROARCA (next section). As the CCAD has become more visible, environmental organizations in the region increasingly demand greater access, and more decentralized approaches for the management and conservation of natural resources. Traditionally, programs have not been designed as a part of a decentralized system that responds to the priority issues posed by conservation and development in a given place, creating greater need for continuity, permanence, and a strengthened regional agenda.   The CCAD was not solely responsible for regional or governmental actions taken to protect the environment after Hurricane Mitch in 1998; the overwhelming demands from within civil society, and non-state actors, provided impetus for the CCAD to coordinate and prioritize efforts more closely. The need for continuity and permanence was emphasized as governments recognized that Central American countries would benefit from increasing the effectiveness of otherwise isolated resource management efforts.   Since the Hurricane, the CCAD has been instrumental directing resources to strengthen civil society participation to rectify the effects of geographies of distance. More often than not, “rural prosperity has had more to do with shifting away from a development model based on social exploitation, foreign aid, and environmental borrowing to one based on sustainable growth” (Arias and Nations, 1992: 24). [MD49] The rural poor constitute new majorities that remain important to appropriate checks and balances within the CCAD, especially in a widening field of political actors in CA. The CCAD has attempted to address the challenge by increasing democratic participation in its processes, while integrating Central America’s protected areas.   PROARCA  USAID has provided financial support to ALIDES since 1995 to strengthen the CCAD, specifically to further empower the Commission as the regional leader on environment and development. The Central American Regional Environmental Program (PROARCA) was established through CONCAUSA with USAID funds contributed to ALIDES.   The goal of the PROARCA/CCAD relationship “was to strengthen the Executive Secretariat of the Commission through direct technical assistance in administrative and financial areas, as well as in support to the Biodiversity and Environmental Legislation Coordinators” (CONCAUSA in Action, 1998: 22). [MD50] The CCAD ‘s success in establishing guidelines, and integrating efforts with international donor initiatives, was codified in April 1997 when Central American Presidents approved efforts to support the establishment and strengthening of the Meso-American Biological Corridor initiative (MBC). More recently, the CCAD has sought to increase representational governance and local ownership of projects by furthering the integration of protected areas into eco-regions, such as the MBC.   Jointly endorsed under ALIDES, the effort catalyzed the CCAD’s enactment of PROARCA-COSTAS for coastal zone management, and the terrestrial counterpart, PROARCA/CAPAS, both designed to consolidate the region’s system of protected areas, leading to the eventual creation of the Meso-American Biological Corridor initiative (MBC) (CONCAUSA, 1998). [MD51] The CCAD has successfully coordinated with institutions and national commissions to promote the inclusion of environmental considerations in other areas. Recently, the CCAD has been given the authority to conduct environmental impact assessments prior to Plan Pueblo Panama’s implementation.   Through ALIDES, multiple stakeholders have created a number protected areas, biosphere reserves, and national parks. CCAD commitments have since been undertaken with the overall objective of establishing a new ecological order in the Central region, giving coherence to the efforts of member countries (Gonzalez and Melendez, 1999: 14-15). The efforts of Central American governments were initially directed toward shared resource issues, according to natural boundaries vs. political boundaries; the Paseo Pantera, later the Meso-American Biological Corridor (MBC) was indicative of the trend (personal interview with Martin Schwartz with the University of Zamorano, formerly with CARE and USAID, 2005).   The creation of the MBC demonstrated CCAD ‘s commitment to protecting the natural patrimony of the region, characterized by high levels of biodiversity. For example, the CCAD has performed a critical role in the creation of the Meso-American Barrier Reef System, peace parks, protected areas, and RAMSAR sites in transboundary regions like the Gulf of Fonseca, shared by Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador; or the San Juan River – Costa Rica | Nicaragua. The MBC is the best example of regional environmental cooperation to protect and rehabilitate the environment. (Utting: 235).[MD52]   In the area of civil-military cooperation, suggestions appropriate for the military: “continue using environmental liaisons to work with civil society organizations at the local, national, and international level to identify projects; leverage resources; continue to identify critical watersheds that feed reservoirs that are essential for irrigation, hydroelectricity, and municipal water supplies; and build and repair terraces and small scale irrigation systems, and reforest denuded watersheds” (Wilburn, in Bradshaw, 2003).[MD53] The CCAD has been central in the transition toward more sustainable forms of environmental governance, where conflicts can be addressed through new norms, institutions, and practices. Unfortunately, transboundary resource management has been too difficult an objective as nascent national and regional environmental institutions have emerged over the last two decades. For example, territorial disputes in the Gulf of Fonseca have often overridden collective resource management issues, such as fisheries, when wider political and economic interests come into conflict with local demands (King, 2009). The challenge remains acute as co-management agreements reached between the countries often remain discourse on paper; used as political tools rather than viable, integrated resource management programs.   Democratic institutions, such as the CCAD must remain central in providing services; confidence building, strengthening institutional capacities, and recognizing local level forms of governance; strengthening democratic reform and the rule of law; increasing transboundary cooperation; and managing vulnerability and uncertainty in the context of climate insecurity and natural resource scarcity. Some of the greatest strides toward regional integration have been directly connected to the CCAD’s efforts in these areas as neoliberal economic reforms have been undertaken. However, the institutional weaknesses and states’ lack of capacity requires new and innovative approaches to natural resource management that build on the successes gleaned from two decades of CCAD’s experiences.   The Populist Road   As myriad challenges are encountered along the road, the forms of resistance to neoliberal ideology will continue to be expressed in heterogeneous forms at a variety of levels; local, national, regional, and international. Consequently, the road ahead looks a bit bumpy.   The impacts of past development practices on the environment, and affects on the labor market, have led numerous organizations to contest further neoliberalization. On 4 May 2007 the Financial Times reported that this contemporary revolution “comes at a time when Latin America is less dependent on the multilateral institutions than at any time since the debt crisis of the early-1980s”, which may be one of the reasons the space has opened up for further change (Financial Times, 4 May 2007).   As the environmental movement’s efforts to resist the effects of neoliberal reforms have become more effective, they have coincided with the resurgence of populist sentiment in the region. One fact is certain, new social movements will continue to resist US interests, and those governments perceived to be colluding with the American Empire, or those states and corporations perceived as exploiting Central America’s land or people.   Civil society’s increase in power relative to the state and the private sector has placed the public in a better position to negotiate the use, management, and conservation of the environment. However, as economic interests trump democratic reforms, the perils of economic inequalities are bound to increase contestation against the United States, governments, and regional bodies.   In sum, an important benefit of the CCAD for Central American countries is continuity and coordination in relation to addressing two fundamental challenges in the region: “the failure to locate environmental protection initiatives within a broader development framework, and the failure to integrate concerns for environmental protection with the needs and rights of local people” (Utting, 1994: 231).[MD54]   Regional integration must avoid undermining local level informal governance arrangements, or common property regimes. When both are adequately approached through the scholarship of engagement, academics and practitioners can illuminate hybrid, diversified, and sometimes more sustainable forms of natural resource management (Utting: 251)[MD55] . In sum, strengthening the CCAD, rather than weakening the institution, should be a central goal as integration continues, as well as the protecting the communities dependent on the resource base the CCAD seeks to conserve.   Regional Environmental Cooperation: Challenges and Solutions   Rapid democratization over the last three decades has led to expanded individual freedoms, greater opportunity for the protection of civil liberties, and opened up democratic space for dialogue. However, the gap between those with, and without access to the benefits of export led growth, have the potential to undermine these advances. More recent democratic institutions, such as the CCAD, have performed a central role in bringing together governments to achieve the wider goals of peace and stability (Kent Butts et al., 2002: v)[MD56] . Furthermore, civil society actors have been able to identify, organize, and create new forms of representation at national, regional, and international scales, often with the assistance of regional bodies such as the CCAD.   The goal toward peace and stability in Central America may be more elusive, as all other goals are subjugated to the neoliberal agenda, as they have been since the 1980s and 1990s. As the distinction between capitalism and democracy is snatched away by the ‘invisible hand of the market’, civil society is increasingly becoming a market society; “freedom is reduced to a market strategy, citizenship narrowed to the market place, or has become utterly privatized” (Giroux, 2004: 125). [MD57] However, democratization of the region is an on-going process that takes place in numerous forums as social actors at various levels seek to carve out new spaces within the public arena, while continuing to make claims about the physical spaces in which they reside. Ensuring that those spaces are protected is most important, institutional arrangements must be strengthened to do so.   The future identity of Central America may hinge on a collective recognition of the extraordinary tropical ecosystems in which people reside. More recent efforts in tourism indicate a trend toward emphasizing the ecological over grand development schemes, although the latter remains a problem as large hotels threaten Garifuna populations on Honduras’ northern coast (Alfredo Kaegi, 2008). [MD58] In turn, as civil society organizations continue to successfully link up with transnational political networks worldwide, and other democratically organized movements, non-state actors will likely carve out more political space to fill the gaps where governments have been unsuccessful.   In this chapter, we have elucidated the challenges associated with environmental governance in post-conflict Central America. We identified a number of challenges the CCAD has confronted related to governance, mirroring those identified by Wilburn et al., “Sea Grant in Latin America; is there a fit?” CCAD has demonstrated its capacity to focus on these challenges in various ways, but institutional strengthening remains important. Wilburn et al., suggestion as a result of State Department funding was to improve environmental governance by strengthening universities by linking applied research, extension, and education. Herein lies the scholarship of engagement, which will be increasingly important as resource challenges demand greater inclusion, knowledge, and outcomes.   We recap the challenges identified throughout this chapter, as well as the solutions that emerged through CCAD experiences over the last two decades. It is our hope that they may be applicable to other regions of the world going through tumultuous democratic and revolutionary changes.  

CHALLENGES	SOLUTIONS
Challenge: Central American countries would benefit from increasing the effectiveness of otherwise isolated resource management efforts affecting continuity and permanence as ‘projects’ are pursued, rather than programs.	Solution: Long-term programs, continuity, and permanence
Challenge: A number of institutions have been duplicating efforts, lack the capacity to leverage resources, and confront high costs.	Solution: Catalyzing the strengths of multiple institutions to leverage resources and increase capacity.
Challenge: Institutions and organizations often function in isolation preventing their ability to learn from one another.	Solution: Reinforce and support existing regional networks for learning and cooperation
Challenge: Programs often lack medium and long-term goals and fail to work in close collaboration with stakeholders and communities.	Solution: Formulating agendas to address urgent needs, while including civil society in deliberative processes.
Challenge: A number of projects in the region lack continuity and a long-term presence that undermines trust with stakeholder groups, and creates a critical constituency that affects the ability to work collaboratively.	Solution: Support opportunities to enhance trust and objectivity
Challenge: Often programs are not designed as a decentralized system that responds to the priority issues posed by conservation and development in a given place.	Solution: Establishing systems of representational governance and local ownership

  The complexity of these challenges are immense, the CCAD more important when it comes to promoting environmental governance. The CCAD must continue to intersect efforts with governmental cabinets of health, agriculture, economy, energy, defense, and security. Coordinating more closely with various ministries and civil society organizations through SICA will also remain important. Increasing collaboration to identify and adopt sustainable approaches to development, with the participation of those concerned, will enable CCAD to strengthen civil society in its efforts toward sustainable development.   Environmental Security and Peacemaking – CCAD Miles Ahead?   Earth’s resources, including water, forests, soils, and air are the basis of human security, ensuring their protection will be central to CCAD’s future efforts. The experiences of the CCAD over the last two decades do demonstrate that proposed paths for environmental cooperation in peacemaking are possible. Two achievements stand out: the CCAD has demonstrated its willingness to engage environmental initiatives to generate an improved climate of intergovernmental relations; the other is rooted in peace-enhancing cross-border societal linkages, (e.g. ALIDES, PARCA, FOSCADES, PROARCA) that result from environmental cooperation, and efforts to promote it” (Conca and Dabelko: 2002: 220). [MD59]   CCAD collaboration with these regional bodies will remain important to advance a common agenda. Although the CCAD has taken the lead in facilitating cooperation within the region, and with actors from outside of the region, there are a number of other institutions within SICA that have made significant contributions toward peace and stability, such as the Regional Committee of Prevention and Handling of Natural Disasters of Central America (CEPREDENAC), Regional Committee of Hydraulic Resources (CRRH), and the Central American Council of Forests. Financing for each of these originates through SICA ‘s multi-annual plan, which facilitates investments in sustainable development and greater inclusion of environmental criteria in development projects. The more recent US strategy in Central America has been underpinned by the “overarching goal of a more stable and prosperous Mexico and Central America, sharing the benefits of trade-led growth broadly among their citizens” in order to reduce poverty (USAID Mexico and Central America Regional Strategy, FY 2004-2009). [MD60] The US and the EU will continue to play a pivotal role in the CA region in relation trade. There is little doubt that Hurricane Mitch immediately generated the political will for several pending decisions at the inter-governmental level – pertaining to both neoliberal economic reform and environmental conservation – pushed rapidly through National Congresses in the countries most heavily affected; Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador. Most SICA-CCAD funds have been directed towards ‘environment and development’ issues, with ‘development’ emphasized more than ‘environment’. CCAD has been the regional institution responsible for addressing shared-resource issues, but its power remains limited due to wider geo-political strategic interests in the region, primarily the dominance of the U.S.   The literal or perceived physical and discursive marginalization of local actors, however, has undoubtedly resulted in conditions that have motivated continuous forms of resistance against the state, industry, and IFIs, before and after Hurricane Mitch. Improving dialogue and communication at the intergovernmental level is likely to achieve little unless there are “changes in the balance of social forces with the emergence of groups or alliances that can challenge the power and influence of traditional elites, constitute new support groups, demand accountability, and bring pressure to bear on policymakers” (Utting: 248). Subsequently, CCAD has sought to increase public participation to ensure civil society ‘s engagement in deliberative processes. Thus, the CCAD, governments, and institutions should remain focused on efforts to increase civil society participation, improve representational governance, and local ownership.   To date, USAID continues to support the CCAD in its efforts, while performing an important role in establishing closer political and economic ties through trade and development – CAFTA-DR. Individual governments continue to strengthen their environmental policies, while seeking to harmonize laws through the CCAD. The CCAD’s role in supporting and promoting public engagement is needed more than ever to ensure civil society is able to actively engage in the region’s development processes. Those actors who have successfully found ways to articulate their interests within the public arena, and through the coordinating efforts of CCAD, are often still denied access by more powerful actors to the physical spaces for which they compete (e.g. economic over environmental considerations).   As neoliberal reforms continue through the enactment of trade agreements, such as CAFTA, environmental security will remain central as economic decisions are made that affect people, and the environments they inhabit. Despite the rapid neoliberal reform efforts, the CCAD’s performance demonstrates that the will for peace and stability through environmental cooperation exist in the region, and that it has opened new spaces for dialogue between the state, private sector, and civil society. The US Congress has agreed to provide an average of $40 million annually through the Environmental Cooperation Agreement (ECA), a component of CAFTA-DR, for labor and environment-related activities. As disbursement of these funds is considered, so should strengthening CCAD’s role in coordinating efforts.   Relative peace and stability have permitted countries in the region greater access to foreign capital to strengthen social sectors, particularly health and education, and to continually integrate the efforts of governments. As Rio+20 approaches, past successes will need to be revisited, and the unequal benefits of neoliberal reforms addressed. The CCAD, numerous NGOs, and civil society will continue to play a critical role in order to ensure that the environment and people don’t reencounter a “lost decade”, especially as the conflicting roads of environment and trade increasingly intersect. In Central America, the road ahead depends on the inclusion of both the environment and people in development policy; if the region seeks to avoid spinning off into spates of further violence and civil unrest.   The link between environmental governance and regional security is now on the agenda at the highest of political and military levels. On 24 July 2003, the Civil Security Forces – Environmental Cooperation in Central America and the Caribbean Summit was held in Belize City, Belize. The US Southern Command, CCAD, and the US Department of State, Central America and Caribbean Regional Environmental Hub Office sponsored the summit. Opening the talks, US Diplomat, Mr. David Alarid, began by saying: “We are pleased to be able to provide a platform that promotes and facilitates both dialogue and actions in the field of regional environmental cooperation and security” (Eds. Bradshaw, et al., 2003: 5). [MD61]   Certainly, there has been a demonstrable increase in the level of environmental conscientiousness on the part of some government officials over the last two decades, particularly since the hurricane. Brigadier General Marco A. Rosales, Honduras noted during the conference “that one excellent sign of the heightened importance of the environment was the increase in participation in this series of Conferences”, this being the fourth. He went on to present a history of the effort to create environmental security consciousness in the region and to create programs that would involve the military in cooperative efforts (Bradshaw, 2003: 10).[MD62]  Regardless of the outcomes environmental cooperation has been a diplomatic achievement on the part of all militaries and civil society ministries in the region over the last decade. The environment, as such, can be described as the olive branch of Central American politics in the 21^st Century.   The goal toward peace and stability, as constituted in the formation of CCAD and SICA, should remain a focus of Central American governments. As economic, military, or political goals are pursued; “the outcome is all too likely to be conflict, whether in the form of disorder or insurrection within a nation, or tensions and hostilities with other nations” (Norman Myers, 1993: 20). [MD63] The environmental basis of political stability must be adequately considered if the Central American region is to secure long-term peace.     [1] http://www.ecoamericas.com/en/issue.aspx[1] http://www.eiu.com/ [2] On 30 May 2007, Robert Zoellick was nominated by President George W. Bush to become President of the World Bank, with Paul Wolfowitz formally stepping down on 30 June. [1] Cuarta Cumbre de Presidentes Centroamericanos, Declaración Conjunta de los Presidentes Centroamericanos Emitida en Costa Del Sol, El Salvador (14 Feb. 1989). [2] Convenio Constitutivo de la Comisión Centroamericana de Ambiente y Desarrollo (San Isidro de Coronado, 12 December 1989) (hereinafter “Convention). [3] Convention, preamble (trans from Spanish). [4] Convention, Article II. [5] Convention, Article IV. [6] Convention, Article III. [7] Convention, Article V. [8] Convention, Article X.